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1 Introduction
This paper studies the implications of inability commit across time for eco-
nomic eﬃciency and decision-making. While there exists a vast literature
on the eﬀects of the inability to commit to a given solution in many applica-
tions (including investment decisions and monetary policy), the implications
of this imperfectness have not been studied much in the context of a house-
hold. This paper asks how the fact that a (married) couple cannot neces-
sarily credibly commit to a future consumption division aﬀects the decision
made today.
The setup of this paper is simple. A couple needs to decide today on
how to divide current consumption between spouses and how much to save.
They cannot credibly agree on how to divide consumption in the future, since
they cannot commit not to renegotiate the current agreement in the future.
Furthermore, the ”balance of power” in the family might be diﬀerent in the
future, so one spouse might have comparative advantage in the family now
that will decay in the future. This potential disparity of ”balance of power”
is shown to lead to an economic ineﬃciency within the household since the
spouses cannot complete Pareto-improving trades between themselves across
periods due to lack of commitment.
This paper remains mostly agnostic about the sources of the diﬀerence
of ”balance of power” across time periods by not explicitly modelling the
phenomen in most cases. It is only assumed that for some reason, the rel-
ative ”welfare weight”1 in the household’s objective function varies across
time periods. The reason why current objective function is not necessary
aligned with the future objective can be justified e.g. by assuming that
the spouses engage in period-by-period bargaining. If, loosely speaking, the
relative outside options of the spouses diﬀer from period to period, then
welfare weights will diﬀer too. Reasons for nonconstant relative outside op-
tions abound: dynamic eﬀects of labor force attachment of spouses (through
human capital acquisition), spouse specific educational investments, the de-
tails divorce laws, remarriage prospects, health shocks2 and time-varying
diﬀering relative attachment to the community outside the family.
1This correspond to the ratios of marginal utilities of consumption on a given period
between spouses in the optimum solution.
2This paper, for most part, does not deal with uncertainty, which is a integral part of
health shocks.
Amajor exception to the agnostic attitude toward the “balance of power”
phenomen is taken in the section dealing with divorce. This paper makes
two contributions to theory of divorce: First it shows how divorce rules
can have an eﬀect on savings for families that stay married through their
eﬀect on the marital bargaining. In a tractable repeated Nash-bargaining
model (a special case of the general model), this eﬀect can be positive or
negative depending on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of the
utility functions. This eﬀect is completely separate from the traditional
“insurance against bad outcome” eﬀect of divorce on savings considered in
Cubeddu and Ríos-Rull (1997).
The second contribution to the theory of divorce is eﬃciency compar-
ison between diﬀerent divorce regimes. It is shown in the section 4 that
a stylized common-law property regime attains full eﬃciency under special
conditions while the community property regime is unlikely to lead to full
eﬃciency. Thus the choice between common-law and community property
regimes involves potentially an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.
This paper is a part of the growing literature of models of family that
models the family not as a single aligned entity, that can be modelled as if it
were an individual agent, but as group of agents whose preferences are not
necessarily completely aligned. While this line of inquiry goes back at least
to Becker (1973), the papers that initiated the more recent interest in this
research topic are papers on Nash bargaining models of family (Manser and
Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981) and papers on the eﬃcient con-
tracting models of family (starting from Chiappori 1988). It is interesting to
note, that many empirical papers in this literature implicitly assume lack of
full commitment across time-periods (and legislative regimes) in household
decision-making. Examples of this are papers using the eﬀects of law changes
to test the single-utility-function view of the household, like Aura (2001),
Duflo (2000) and Lunberg, Pollack and Wales(1996).
This paper can be seen as a simple extension of the framework set out
in the series of papers by Chiappori and his coauthors into dynamic setting.
Mazzocco (2000) extends similar ideas as this paper, although its focus is
diﬀerent. Mazzocco’s analysis of risk is more general than in this paper,
but he restricts his analysis of investment decisions into cases where one
household member holds all the property rights on the assets.
There are two separate branches of literature that are closely related to
this paper. First, a new and a small branch is the one which this paper is
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also belongs to: the literature on savings decisions and family bargaining.
Three papers are worth mentioning here: Browning (2000), Lundberg and
Ward-Batts (2000), and Lundberg, Startz and Stillman (2002). Browning
(2001) presents a two-period game-theoretic model, where he shows that un-
der certain assumption, the non-cooperatively made savings and investment
decisions yield full Pareto eﬃciency. Papers by Lundberg and coauthors on
the other hand are mostly empirical papers trying to shed light on retirement
related issues (like the drop in consumption at retirement) using household
bargaining logic and models relatively similar to, although simpler than, the
ones presented in this paper.
The other related literature is the growing literature on informal insur-
ance arrangements. Two examples of this are Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000)
and Ligon, Thomas and Worral (2000). This literature emphasizes the same
issue as this paper: the inability to commit across time (and states of the
world). However, since most of this literature is on agricultural communi-
ties in developing countries, they do not see savings as the most interesting
aspect (since the crop cannot be stored indefinitely) and emphasize risk-
sharing almost solely. Ligon et al. do consider savings, but while coming
close to the results of the first part of this paper, they do not emphasize the
role of savings in their model.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 analyzes the eﬀect of lack of commitment on the households savings
level. Section 4 analyzes eﬃciency properties of diﬀerent divorce regimes.
Section 5 considers the problem of life-insurance protection for surviving
spouses. Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic model and results
Can a married couple commit to a given consumption path and sharing rule
across time? One reason to think that the answer to this question might
be negative is that the outside options (outcomes, should they divorce) of
the spouses might evolve in time. This might make the agreement based on
yesterday’s balance of power unsustainable today. If this is the case, then
in today’s decision making the couple has to take into account the eﬀect of
today’s choices on future decisions. This dynamic linkage, through the fact
that future behavior is constrained by the outcome of future renegotiation
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process and the fact that today’s choices aﬀect this process, is the central
attention of the study undertaken in this paper. In order to proceed, this
paper makes three further assumptions on the decision making process.
First, the within-period decision-making is assumed to Pareto-eﬃcient
with respect to the constraints. This can be seen either as a simple modelling
choice or as a statement about possible interactions within a couple. If we
assume that no motives of malice guide the decision-making (and even these
could be incorporated into the utility functions) it is hard to believe that
a partner in a couple would turn down suggested change that would make
both partners better oﬀ while fully taking into account the constraints of
the problem. At least as long as the partners are suﬃciently patient and the
random divorce risk3 is suﬃciently low, it is a justifiable working assumption
to assume that the couple can overcome prisoner’s dilemma type problems
that they might face.
The second, related assumption, is a very strong assumption on ratio-
nality. In the models that follow, it is assumed that in making decisions
about savings and investment (these could broadly be viewed to include
decisions about human capital investment) the strategic element of each of
these decisions in the future is fully understood and incorporated in the
decision making. By the structure of the models that follow (say repeated
Nash-bargaining), this means that the couple is able to understand the very
complicated dynamic eﬀects of current period decisions.
Third important assumption is that of full information. While many
of the results presented here are or could be extended to one type of un-
certainty (exogenous risks) the issues relating to asymmetric information
(hidden knowledge or hidden actions) within marriage are not considered.
This can be viewed as an important caveat in modelling families, since it
might be argued that one of the spouses often has informational advantage
3The simplistic view on divorce taken in this paper is the following. Each period two
states of the world are possible: under the normal circumstances, the couple continues
together if their utility from sticking together under the cooperative regime is higher than
in the case of divorce. However, in each period, there is a remote chance of a random
shock that irrespective of economic variables makes the couple incompatible with each
other (say one partner is caught cheating). The latter (an unmodelled phenomen) is what
is called the risk of divorce in this paper. Also, for most of the paper the break-up of
relationship is interchangeable with divorce, since unless diﬀerent legal environments are
explicitly modelled, it does not matter whether the couple is legally married or not for the
decision making problem.
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over families finances (the one who takes care of the day-to-day finances).
This possible extension is left to further research.
To illustrate the decision-making problem that the couple4 faces, when it
cannot commit to a time-consistent solution, consider the following problem.
Let the world last for T -periods. Assume that there is no uncertainty and
that the only decision the couple faces at period t is how much to save and
how to divide the current consumption between spouses. Assume that the
life-time utility functions of respective spouses are defined as time-separable
utilities over their own consumption only:
Um =
TX
t=1
umt (cmt )
and Uf =
TX
t=1
uft (c
f
t ),
where superscripts m and f refer to husband and wife respectively.
The inability to commit means that future behavior is taken into account
as a constraint on the constrained Pareto-eﬃcient decision program at every
period. Starting from last period this means that at period T the problem
that couple solves is:5
V mT (AT ) = max
cmT ,c
f
T
umT (cmT )
subject to AT = cmT + c
f
T
and ufT (c
f
T ) = V
f
T (AT ),
4The assumption that there are exactly two members of the family whose utility func-
tions are relevant for the decision making will matter for the results that follow. So this
paper’s results do not necessarily extend to families with teenage or grown-up children or
other family members participating in the decision process. The key is that children can
be included through the eﬀect of their consumption through parent’s utility functions, but
not as someone exerting any power in the decision-making.
5As long as we assume that there is only one private consumption good the period T
maximization is trivial.
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for some function V fT (AT ) that represent wife’s period specific utility
level at time T in the optimum.6 The V mT (AT ) and V
f
T (AT ) functions are
reduced form representations of the household decision-making process, rep-
resenting the point in the utility possibility frontier that the household will
choose. A leading example of structural form representation that could be
characterized by these functions is Nash-bargaining between spouses (being
a member of the class of Pareto eﬃcient decision-making processes).
Working backwards, at period T − 1 the household now has three choice
variables, current consumption of respective spouses and the assets level
at period T . The inability to commit across time is captured by the fact
that they cannot contract on the respective consumption levels of spouses
at period T . Instead, they have to take the decision process in the period T
as a constraint while making decisions at time T − 1. One possible way to
characterize this constrained decision problem is:
V mT−1(AT−1) = max
cmT−1,c
f
T−1,AT
umT−1(cmT−1) + V mT (AT )
subject to AT−1 = cmT−1 + c
f
T−1 +
AT
(1 + rT−1)
and ufT−1(c
f
T−1) = V
f
T−1(AT−1)− V
f
T (AT ),
where, as earlier, V fT−1(AT−1) represents the sum of the wife’s period-
specific utilities at period T − 1 and T in the optimum. The functions
V mT−1(AT−1) and V
f
T−1(AT−1) give us a reduced form representation of the
decision making process without commitment.
Using backward induction this leads to following characterization of the
problem:
6This is nothing more than the usual characterization of Pareto-eﬃcient choice, except
that for generality it is assumed that the wife’s utility level is a function of the wealth
holdings of the household at period T . The dependence of V fT on the wealth holding
makes it possible to characterize general eﬃcient forms of household decision-making (like
Nash-bargaining or social welfare function maximization) where an increase of wealth
available in the period T will in general have eﬀect on the utilities and consumptions of
both spouses.
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V mt (At) = max
cmt ,c
f
t ,At+1
umt (cmt ) + V mt+1(At+1)
subject to At = cmt + c
f
t +
At+1
(1 + rt)
and uft (c
f
t ) = V
f
t (At)− V
f
t+1(At+1).
The first constraint is the usual budget constraint, where At is the re-
maining life-time wealth of the couple at period t.7 The second constraint is
the usual Pareto-eﬃciency requirement altered to take into account that the
couple is constrained by the process characterizing their decision-making in
the future and cannot commit to (potentially better) future consumption
allocations that are incompatible with that process. Naturally, a completely
equivalent characterization of the process is the maximization of the wife’s
life-time utility subject to constraint on the husbands utility level. This inter-
changeability will become useful in providing short proofs for the theorems.
A key assumption in the definition of Vt-functions is that they are func-
tions of the current assets holdings only. Thus, while this will be extended in
one direction to handle multiple assets, it precludes complicated dynamic de-
pendencies from past actions. This assumption can be defended on tractabil-
ity grounds and by its intuitive appeal.8
It is important to understand that the above is meant to be a characteri-
zation of the optimum in a same way as Pareto-frontier characterizes possible
optima in a usual exchange economy setting. This means that while we can
study properties of the optimum using this characterization, we cannot de-
rive comparative statics with respect to changes of the economic parameters
without specifying the structural process by which the couple arrives into
the solution.9 Thus, without further specification of the process we can
7All the analysis in this paper would go through when At is construed as the net
wealth of the couple at time t, and in each period each partners gets an additional amount
(possible negative) of income Imt and Ift respectively. While completely equivalent charac-
terizations of the dynamic budget constraint in the current environment, in the extensions
this allows for the respective It-processes to be contingent on the divorce or widowhood
states. Thus the results do extend to a more general specification of the household’s
state-contingent budget constraint.
8However, this excludes the possibility that the assets division in case of divorce might
be aﬀected by e.g. a spending spree prior to divorce by one of the spouses.
9A reduced-form way of doing this would be to parametrize the V ft -function family.
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study types of ineﬃciencies that can arise and if we find policy interven-
tion that can lead to a first-best solution, we can claim that it will make at
least one member of the couple better oﬀ. However, without getting into the
black box of family decision making, the approach followed in this section
cannot be used to say anything about within family redistributive eﬀects.
This is an important qualification, since some of eﬃciency-enhancing policy
recommendations of this paper might have huge distributive impacts (like
the desirability of common-law divorce asset division regime over community
property regime purely on eﬃciency grounds).
To characterize the eﬃciency properties and to describe the nature of
ineﬃciencies that can arise because of the lack of commitment across time
periods, the following assumption will be made.
Assumption 1 (More wealth is better for both in every period) V m0t ≥ 0
and V f 0t ≥ 0 for all time periods in the optimum solution.
The justification for assumption 1 is that it bounds the bargaining eﬀect
of wealth to not dominate the intuitive eﬀect of more wealth (the expansion
of the budget set in the future eﬀect dominates the bargaining eﬀect of more
wealth). A problem with assumption 1 is that it is in terms of both V m0t and
V f 0t . While intuitively appealing, this is not completely satisfactory, since
only one of the Vt-functions should be taken as fundamental of the problem
(i.e. reduced form presentation of the bargaining process), the other being a
quantity derived from the optimization solution. While the author feels that
assumption 1 is a reasonable restriction on the class of admissible models
under many circumstances, this might not be satisfactory to all the readers.
Therefore it is also necessary to give fundamental suﬃcient conditions that
would yield Assumption 1. A set of alternative conditions guaranteeing
that assumption 1 holds is given as lemma 0.
Lemma 0. Any one of the following assumptions is suﬃcient for As-
sumption 1 to be satisfied:
a) Value functions are independent of wealth for one of the spouses: V f 0t = 0
∀t, At or V mt = 0 ∀t, At.
An analogy of this into the exchange economy setting is that while we can study the
properties of the Pareto-frontier, in order to say how the equilibrium changes with respect
to the outside parameters, we need to make additional assumptions (like price-taking and
utility maximation) to have predictions about the eﬀects of parameter changes.
8
b) Two period world and wealth good for both in second period: let T = 2
and let the second period solution be characterized by a sharing rule
for wealth: cm2 = ψ2(A2) and c
f
2 = A2 − ψ2(A2) . Furthermore let
0 ≤ ψ20 ≤ 1.
c) T-period world, with last period described as in b) and letting the series
of functions V ft (At) satisfy following conditions: V
f 0
t ≥ 0, V
f 00
t ≤ 0
∀t, At and
(1 + rt)V f 0t+1(A) ≥ V
f 0
t (A) ∀t, A.
d) Like c), but applying the restrictions on V mt (A)-functions.
e) CRRA-utilities and outside options in repeated Nash-bargaining: Let
Assumptions 2-5 hold of the section 3 hold.
f) V m0t ≥ 0 and V m0t ≤ um0t ∀t in the solution; or equivalently V
f 0
t ≥ 0 and
V f 0t ≤ u
f 0
t ∀t in the solution.
Proof: See Appendix.
The point of Lemma 0 is to illustrate that Assumption 1 covers a large
class of interesting problems. Some of these alternative conditions need fur-
ther commenting: first f) is nothing more than restatements of Assumption
1 using envelope theorem to derive more interpretable conditions. It suﬀers
from the same weakness as Assumption 1, it refers to quantities (marginal
utilities of consumption) that are defined in the optimum.
Condition a) provides an interesting special case, where one of the spouses,
say the husband, has constant outside options. This means, that in the opti-
mum, the wife will attain full eﬃciency in her consumption plan even though
the husband’s consumption plan might be distorted.
Condition e) provides an example of a structural model that satisfies the
Assumption 1.
Conditions b), c) and d) are the most fundamental. Condition b) uses
two-stage budgeting in the last period as the starting point (the sharing rule
of assets). This can be viewed as fundamental description of the bargaining
and not as an outcome.10 Conditions c) and d) extend this with relatively
10Unfortunately this two-stage budgeting does not extend to any other than last period.
In all other periods there are three goods, one of which is a public good (assets in the next
period).
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strong assumptions into T-period setting. However, the wide class of prob-
lems that will satisfy Assumption 1 will become evident from the proof of
condition c). From that proof we can see that condition c) is just a very
strong suﬃcient condition that can be violated while Assumption 1 still
holds.11 Thus Assumption 1 is rather general.
Definition 1. (Undersaving and oversaving) Define the situation where
um0t < (1+rt)um0t+1 and u
f 0
t < (1+rt)u
f 0
t+1 as undersaving and situation where
both inequalities are reversed as oversaving.
The justification for the definition of undersaving is that it defines a
situation where a both spouses would prefer to transfer current consumption
into next period consumption. It is noteworthy, that the definition here
applies to consecutive time periods only.
Theorem 1. Let assumption 1 be satisfied. In the optimum there cannot
be undersaving nor oversaving.12
Proof: Let µt and λt be the Lagrange-multipliers for the budget con-
straint and the wife’s utility level constraint on the period t-suboptimization.
The first order conditions for the optimization are:
um0t − µt = 0
λtuf 0t − µt = 0
V m0t+1 −
µt
1 + rt
+ λtV f 0t+1 = 0.
11Condition c) is too strong in two senses. First, it requires that the inequality holds
for all values of possible values of A. However, this is only done to avoid a (circular)
reference to quantities relating to the optimum. Another suﬃcient condition is that (1 +
rt)V f0t+1(At+1) ≥ V
f0
t (At), where At+1 and At are the quantities chosen in the optimum
(this form is implied by the for all values of A condition, concavity of V f0
0
t and by the fact
that At ≥ At+1). Even this is not necessary, since this inequality condition is also just a
suﬃcient condition, that may not be satisfied while Assumption 1 still holds.
12Note that the non-negativity constraints on consumptions are ignored in the speci-
fication. While this is mostly to save on notation, it is not completely without loss of
generality. An assumption that would guarantee an interior optimum with respect to con-
sumption is that limcqt→0 u
q0
t (c
q
t ) = ∞ ∀t where q ∈ {m, f}. Otherwise Theorem 1 might
not hold for if the non-negativity constraint on consumption are imposed and at least one
of these constraints is binding in the optimum.
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Using the envelope theorem and the first order condition with respect
husband’s consumption the intertemporal first order condition can manipu-
lated as:
µt+1 − λt+1V
f 0
t+1 −
µt
1 + rt
+ λtV f 0t+1 = 0⇔
um0t+1 −
um0t
1 + rt
= (λt+1 − λt)V f 0t+1.
By considering the same problem from wife’s perspective (and using
relations between the Lagrange coeﬃcients in the two problems), the in-
tertemporal first order condition for the wife can be written as:
uf 0t+1 −
uf 0t
1 + rt
=
µ
1
λt+1
− 1
λt
¶
V m0t+1.
By applying the envelope theorem, the dynamic first order conditions
can be now written as:
um0t+1 −
um0t
1 + rt
= (λt+1 − λt)V f 0t+1
uf 0t+1 −
uf 0t
1 + rt
= um0t+1
µ
1
λt+1
− 1
λt
¶Ã
1−
V f 0t+1
uf 0t+1
!
,
or equivalently as
um0t+1 −
um0t
1 + rt
= uf 0t+1 (λt+1 − λt)
µ
1−
V m0t+1
um0t+1
¶
uf 0t+1 −
uf 0t
1 + rt
=
µ
1
λt+1
− 1
λt
¶
V m0t+1.
The result is immediate from the above.¥
It is well worth noting, that this result does not carry over to non-
consecutive time periods: an counterexample for more general result will
be given in the next section. The following are constructed examples of
undersaving and oversaving, when Assumption 1 is not satisfied:
Example 1 (Undersaving). Consider a two period world with no
discounting. Let both spouses have identical separable log utility functions
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over first and second period consumption. Let total lifetime wealth of the
couple be 4. Let the outcome of the second period negotiation between
spouses be characterized13 by cf2 = 1 − 0.1 ∗ A2 and let the first period
required utility level for wife be zero (achievable e.g. by consuming 1 each
period). In the optimum (approximately) cm1 = 1.00, cm2 = .96, c
f
2 = 1.21
and cf2 = .82.
Example 2 (Oversaving). Like example 1, but let the outcome of the
second period negotiation be characterized by cf2 = 2 − 0.1 ∗ A2. In the
optimum (approximately) cm1 = .81, cm2 = .86, c
f
2 = .57 and c
f
2 = 1.7.
Corollary 2. (Multiple goods) Let period t consumption vector be
divided into three separate components for each period: cmt , c
f
t and c
p
t (hus-
band’s consumption, wife’s consumption and within household public goods
consumption respectively). Theorem 1 holds for between any arbitrary pairs
of husband’s and wife’s private consumption.
Proof of Corollary 2. Similar to theorem 1 with additional notation.¥
Unfortunately, the Euler equation for the household public goods does
not yield any interesting economic intuition.
Further interesting extension of the theorem 1 is to include labor sup-
ply decisions (or leisure consumption) as one of the choice variables. In the
simplest case, where both spouses have a period-specific exogenously given
period-specific wages, corollary 2 is all we need analyze this case. How-
ever, the labor supply decisions in this dynamic model becomes extremely
interesting, when one allows for the the following generalizations:
1) The current period wage is aﬀected by the past labor supply decisions
2) The current period wages of the spouses aﬀect their relative positions
in the family decision-making.
Formally these two eﬀects can be taken into account by specifying that
wft = f
f
t (w
f
t−1, L
f
t−1) and wmt = fmt (wmt−1, Lmt−1), where w stands for wage
and L for labor supply, and that V ft = V
f
t (At, wmt , w
f
t ). Three interesting
results arise from this extension. First is that the theorem 1 continues to
hold for the consumption goods (but not for the labor supplies). The sec-
ond is the obvious fact that even under full commitment the labor supply
13Equivalently this can stated as V f2 (A2) = log(1− 0.1 ∗A2). This means that V
f0
2 < 0.
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decisions must take the dynamic (human capital) eﬀects of the labor supply
decisions into account (so marginal disutility of labor is equated with the
sum of the wage and the marginal dynamic eﬀect of labor supply to the fu-
ture wages). The third is that without commitment, labor supply becomes a
”strategic” variable: because through future wages it aﬀects future bargain-
ing, in setting the labor supply this eﬀect has to take into account. Thus
the model is compatible with the eﬀect put forward in Wells and Maher
(1998), where they argue that for strategic reasons the lower-earning ca-
pacity spouses might not specialize in home-production because this would
diversely aﬀect their future bargaining position.
Theorem 1 and its extension would provide an interesting starting point
for empirical investigation. Since Theorem 1 is very robust to additions to
the model, it could be used either in panel or repeated cross-section setting
to test the theory of eﬃcient decision-making without commitment. The
data requirement for this kind of exercise are not simple. Like most other
test of new models of household in economics, it would require data on
consumption items that are assignable to spouses (pure private goods in the
household, or at least goods that have arguable much stronger eﬀect on one
spouse’s utility). This empirical application is left for further research.
3 Eﬀect of lack of commitment on the level of sav-
ings
Beyond the question of eﬃciency (i.e. would more or less savings be Pareto-
improvement), it is interesting to also ask, whether lack of commitment
causes the couple to save more or less than in a world where they could
commit from day one to a consumption plan. As explained earlier, this is
a question that cannot be asked in the most general framework, since this
change in environment will almost always include redistribution eﬀects too.
Hence, one needs more specific model to answer this question. The model
presented in this section will give one answer to this question: in this model,
the eﬀect of inability to commit is similar to the eﬀect of as decrease of the
assets return. In the end of this section, it is shown how a small change in
the assumptions can be used to generate a completely diﬀerent answer. This
counterexample should not be viewed as nothing more than a proof that the
result does not admit arbitrary generalizations, since the model presented
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in this section still has intuitive appeal as a possible characterization of the
household’s decision-making process.
This section makes also general point about the feedback of divorce rules
to savings behavior. In previous literature (like in Cubeddu and Ríos-Rull
1997) the eﬀect of divorce on the savings behavior is an insurance eﬀect:
the savings are positively linked to higher probability of divorce because the
marginal utilities of consumption are assumed to be higher in divorce state.
This eﬀect could be trivially incorporated to the model of this section, but to
save on notation it is omitted. The feedback eﬀect of divorce rules on savings
that is presented in this section operates through a diﬀerent channel: the
future divorce property division rules aﬀect bargaining power in the future
and this can have (positive or negative) eﬀect on savings in a model where
decisions are renegotiated each period.
Assumption 2. (CRRA utilities) Let both spouses have life time
utility function that can be written in the time separable CRRA-form:
Um =
1
1− θm
TX
k=1
(βm)k−1(cmk )1−θ
m
Uf =
1
1− θf
TX
k=1
(βf )k−1(cfk)
1−θf
Assumption 3. (Nash-Bargaining with divorce outside options)
Let the household decision making process be repeated Nash-bargaining
without commitment across time periods, so the period t decision making
process can be characterized as:
max
cmt ,c
f
t,At+1
µµ
1
(1− θm) (c
m
t )
1−θm + V mt+1(At+1)
¶
− V˜ mt (At)
¶
∗
µ
1
(1− θf )
µ³
cft
´1−θf
+ V ft+1(At+1)
¶
− V˜ ft (At)
¶
subject to At = cmt + c
f
t +
At+1
(1 + rt)
,
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where V mt+1(At+1) and V
f
t+1(At+1) are the value functions characterizing
the utility value of future periods for a given asset level in period t+ 1 and
where V˜ mt (At) and V˜
f
t (At) characterize the outside options of spouses should
the negotiation break down and divorce occur. Thus, the outside option
functions incorporate all the relevant information on the institutions (e.g.
divorce assets division rules) and environment (e.g. remarriage prospects)
relevant to spouses should they divorce. Furthermore, let us assume that
once divorce happens, it is final.
Assumption 4. Let the outside option functions be of the form:
V˜ qt (At) = max{c˜qi }Ti=t
1
1− θq
TX
k=t
(β˜q)k−t(τ qk c˜
q
k)
1−θq
subject to ψqt (At) =
TX
k=t
c˜qk
Πkj=t(1 + rj)j−t
,
where q ∈ {m, f}. Parameters τ qk (typically < 1) presents how much
utility loss is there in each period from being divorced. Furthermore assume
linear sharing rule of property in case of divorce so that
ψqt (At) =
½
αtAt, if q = m
(1− αt)At, if q = f
.
Assumption 5. (Identical discount factor and CRRA parame-
ter) Let θm = θf ≡ θ and βm = βf ≡ β.
Theorem 3 Let assumptions 2-5 hold. The inability to commit across
periods implies higher wealth holdings in every period after initial period
(more savings) if θ > 1. For θ = 1 (log utility) the level of savings is un-
aﬀected by the inability to commit. For θ < 1 the inability to commit
decreases savings in every period.
Proof: In the appendix.
Theorem 3 provides a special case where inability to commit across time-
periods acts analogously as decrease of the return on the asset. Thus, when
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher than 1 (i.e. θ < 1) the
inability to commit decreases savings. When elasticity of intertemporal
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substitution is less than 1 (i.e. θ > 1) the inability to commit increases
savings.
How good a guide is Theorem 3 for our intuition about the eﬀects of
inability to commit to savings level in more general cases? The following is an
artificial counterexample to show that changing just one of the assumptions
can turn this conclusion around.
Example 3 (Property rights regimes matter for the savings
level). Let both spouses have time separable log utilities with no dis-
counting. Let the lifetime wealth of the couple be 4 and let the interest
rate be zero. Let the decision be made through repeated Nash-bargaining.
Let the first period outside option be characterized like in assumption 3
(with τm1 = τ
f
1 = τm2 = τ
f
2 = 0.8). Let the wife have second period
outside option equal to zero (=log(1), meaning that husband has to pro-
vide her with 1/0.8 = 1.25 in the case of divorce in the second period)
and hence the husband’s second period outside option is to consume the
rest of the assets after providing his wife’s after divorce. In the solution,
cm1 = 0.99, cm2 = 0.96, c
f
1 = 0.83 and c
f
2 = 1.22. Thus the wealth at the
start of the second period is 2.18, which is larger than what solution with
commitment would be (= 2, since the eﬃcient solutions involve both con-
suming 1 in each time period).
Examples 4 and 5 use the models of this section to show that Theorem
1 holds only for consecutive periods even if Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Example 4. (Undersaving) Consider three times repeated Nash-bargaining
problem as described in this section. Let θm = θf = .5, α1 = .75, α2 =
.65, α3 = .95 and τm1 = τ
f
1 = τm2 = τ
f
2 = τm3 = τ
f
3 = .8. Let the couple have
life-time wealth of 6. In the solution, cm1 = 1.70, cm2 = .90, cm3 = 1.45, c
f
1 =
.43, cf2 = 1.29 and c
f
3 = 0.22. Thus, an increase of consumption in the period
3 for both spouses and a decrease in period 1 consumption for both spouses
would be Pareto improving.
Example 5. (Oversaving) Let θm = θf = 2, α1 = .9, α2 = .8, α3 = .95
and τm1 = τ
f
1 = τm2 = τ
f
2 = τm3 = τ
f
3 = .8. Let the couple have life-time
wealth of 6. In the solution, cm1 = 1.68, cm2 = 1.11, cm3 = 2.11, c
f
1 = .20,
cf2 = .65 and c
f
3 = 0.24.
Example 6 below makes a point that is rather general to the class of mod-
els considered in this paper: an increase of one partner’s (say wife’s) outside
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option in the future can be bad for both partners by making pre-existing
dynamic distortions worse. So while in general redistribution towards wife
should be good for her this eﬃciency eﬀect of redistribution eﬀect can domi-
nate the positive future redistribution eﬀect under some circumstances. This
observation has an application to changes in pension legislation: say that
the rights of non-working spouses (say wives’) on their husband’s pension
are enhanced (like in the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 analyzed in Aura
2001) and this legislation becomes as an unexpected shock. The eﬀects on
the couples who are at the “retirement” period are straightforward: the
wives benefits on their husbands expense. However, the eﬀect of such a leg-
islation can be welfare deteriorating on young couples: it is possible that for
them, both are worse oﬀ because this future redistribution makes the pre-
existing distortions worse. The opposite might also hold for young couples,
the legislation might decrease the pre-existing distortions and make both
spouses better oﬀ.
Example 6. (Future redistribution can be welfare decreasing for both
spouses) Consider twice repeated Nash-bargaining model as in this section,
with no discounting and log-utilities. Let τm1 = τ
f
1 = τm2 = τ
f
2 = .8 and
let the life-time wealth of the couple be 4. The table below characterizes
the life-time utilities attained by prospective spouses under three diﬀerent
divorce property division arrangement:
Table 1. Life-time utilities of spouses under diﬀerent property regimes.
α1 α2 Um Uf
0.5 0.5 0 0
0.5 0.4 -0.0694 0.0289
0.5 0.25 -0.2461 -0.0517
4 Divorce
This section continues to consider the case where divorce outcomes define
the outside options of the spouses. The question asked in this section is
whether the family of models considered here can give strong policy recom-
mendations, i.e. whether changes in divorce laws could be used to restore
first-best solutions. The answer to this shown to depend crucially on how one
views divorce. If divorce is just an oﬀ-equilibrium path event, then the first-
best solution can be easily restored. However, adding (even small) additional
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risk of getting into the divorce state will destroy this conclusion. Perhaps
surprisingly it is shown that in general even “divorce insurance”-products
could not restore eﬃciency.
It is interesting to compare the results of this section to the real world
existing divorce property division regimes. The two-assets model of this
section can be viewed as stylized common-law property regime, where both
spouses can own assets while married without them becoming jointly owned.
A special case of single assets model is a community property regime where
the property accumulated during marriage would be split 50-50 in case of
divorce. Generally, community property regime is viewed as more progres-
sive and more “pro-women” or “pro-weaker spouse” (Weitzman 1990). Dnes
(1999) argues that a community property regime is likely to be more eﬃ-
cient, since it provides lesser incentives for costly litigation in case divorce
than community property and since, at least in England, the discretion that
judges have in common-law property regime creates excess uncertainty.14
The results of this section are not supportive of Dnes’ conclusion (al-
though, they do not consider the eﬀects that Dnes emphasizes). Consider
community property regime through the following description of marriage.
In the beginning of marriage, the spouses both own some assets. These
assets can be covered by prenuptial contract to assign permanent property
rights on them. The assets accumulated during marriage15 are divided 50-
50 in case of divorce. Now if the assets are the only thing that matter for
relative outside options (like in the examples in the previous sections) there
is no reason to expect that the community property regime does not yield
the first-best solution in the simple model that has no exogenous divorce
risk. However, other factors also can aﬀect the outside options and these
factors can lead to a non-constant time path of relative outside options.
These factors can include remarriage prospects, attachment to community
outside the couple and human capital accumulation that are unlikely to be
14 In the US community property states are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. In addition, Puerto Rico is
a community property jurisdiction. However, since 1970s, all of the common-law states
(with the exception of Missisipi) have enacted so called ”equitable division” clauses, that
make their legislation be somewhere between the two extrememes considered here. In
UK, Scotland has community property regime, while Wales and England have common-
law regime (Dnes 1999). Many continental European countries have community property
regime (Dnes 1999).
15 In the US, depending on the State, the asset accumulation that is considered com-
munity property can include human capital components like acquired degrees (Weitzman
1990).
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included (at least perfectly) in the community property valuation. Also, if
the community property valuation is not perfectly forward-looking and the
pre-marital assets are not divided equally in the prenuptial contract, then
this potentially leads to a non-constant path of relative outside options even
if the assets are sole factor aﬀecting outside options. In contrast, Theorem
4 states that under a stylized common-law setting the couple can take care
oﬀ these disparities themselves by trading future property rights to current
consumption and attain first-best eﬃciency.
The point of Theorem 4 is not to say that common-law regime is neces-
sarily more desirable than community property regime. Instead Theorem 4
is meant to highlight the possible eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ between these
two regimes. Under the common-law regime the couple attains a point in the
unrestricted life-time utility possibilities frontier. This point does not nec-
essarily Pareto-dominate the solution under community property. Thus, by
forcing the community property rules on the couple the government can pos-
sible attain distributional goals, but since this typically involves a departure
from the first-best intertemporal and intrapersonal allocation of consump-
tion within the couple, this possible equity gain comes with an eﬃciency
cost. Whether a common-law regime is more desirable than community
property regime therefore depends on the magnitudes of these gains and
losses and how these gains and losses are weighted in the social objective.
4.1 No-equilibrium path divorce
Consider the environment of Theorem 1 with the following modifications:
Assume that there are more than one asset (without loss of generality,
we can assume that there are only two assets), with possibly diﬀerent rates
of rates of return.16 Assume that what drives the power in decision-making
is the outcome for the spouses should they divorce. An obvious structural
model having this implication is repeated Nash-bargaining with divorce as
outside option.
The decision problem can now be written as:
16For simplicity, it is assumed that the rates of return are non-stochastic.
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V mt (Amt , A
f
t ) = max
cmt ,c
f
t ,Amt+1,Amt+1
umt (cmt ) + V mt+1(Amt+1, A
f
t+1)
subject to Amt +A
f
t = c
m
t + c
f
t +
Amt+1
(1 + rmt )
+
Aft+1
(1 + rft )
uft (c
f
t ) = V
f
t (A
m
t , A
f
t )− V
f
t+1(A
m
t+1, A
f
t+1),
where Amt (A
f
t respectively) represents the assets that has stronger eﬀect
on the husband’s (wife’s) utility in the future since he has larger marginal
claim on this assets in case of divorce. As always in this paper, assume that
there are no liquidity constraints. The first-order conditions characterizing
the optimal choice are:
um0t − µt = 0
λtuf 0t − µt = 0
∂V mt+1
∂Amt+1
− µt
1 + r1t
+ λt
∂V ft+1
∂Amt+1
= 0
∂V mt+1
∂Aft+1
− µt
1 + r2t
+ λt
∂V ft+1
∂Aft+1
= 0.
Now, make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 6. (Diﬀerent marginal eﬀects of assets on out-
comes) There does not exists a pair of Amt , A
f
t for any t such that
∂V ft+1
∂Amt+1
=
∂V ft+1
∂Aft+1
.
Assumption 7. (Equal rates of return) Let rmt = r
f
t ≡ rt for all t.
Assumption 6 can be justified in a case of divorce as outside option
Nash-bargaining, where the marginal rights to assets in case of divorce are
diﬀerent, since while increase in each asset has similar eﬀect on the budget
set, they will have diﬀering eﬀect on the outside options in the next period.
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Theorem 4. Let assumption 6 and 7 hold and let an interior optimum
exits. The resulting outcome without commitment is fully eﬃcient.
Proof: The first order conditions can be rearranged to yield:Ã
∂V ft+1
∂Amt+1
−
∂V ft+1
∂Aft+1
!
(λt − λt+1) = 0.
Since this is true for all time-periods, this means that λt = λt0 ∀t, t0.
This combined with the basic dynamic first-order conditions
um0t+1 −
um0t
1 + rt
= (λt+1 − λt)
∂V ft+1
∂Amt+1
uf 0t+1 −
uf 0t
1 + rt
=
µ
1
λt+1
− 1
λt
¶
∂V mt+1
∂Amt+1
,
will yield the fully eﬃcient solution:
um0t = (1 + rt)um0t+1
uf 0t = (1 + rt)u
f 0
t+1.¥
The intuition for theorem 4 comes from incomplete markets analogy.
With just one asset, the couple is constrained in the way it can transform
current consumption to future consumption. With two assets and assump-
tions 6 and 7, they have two assets that span the whole space of required
transactions.
Three major caveats are in order, before one thinks of Theorem 4 hav-
ing strong public policy implications. While Theorem 4 seems to be say-
ing that the eﬃcient divorce laws would let the married couple (while still
married) decide on who owns what portions of their net worth in case of di-
vorce (by having “his” and “hers” accounts), this does not take into account
that moving from a single-asset world (community property) to a stylized
common-law regime would imply a redistribution of welfare within family.
As is typical, a move from one ineﬃcient regime to a Pareto-eﬃcient regime
is not necessarily a Pareto-improvement. Also, consideration of independent
divorce risk will alter the conclusion of the Theorem 4.
Third major caveat to Theorem 4 is that unlike many of the theorems
in this paper it does not extend straightforwardly to the case where there
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is any asset return or other risk (like health shocks) that aﬀects the V -
functions. If this extension is taken into account, then one needs to consider
the incomplete risk sharing aspect of lack of intertemporal commitment.
This question and its implications on the desirability of common-law versus
community property regime is left for further research.
An interesting point to note about this model (now for generality, assume
that there can be more than two assets) is that the model is consistent with
interior optimum without any constraints in cases where one assets return
is dominated by some other assets return. This is obvious from the first-
order conditions, if the property rights (i.e. the eﬀects on the next period’s
value functions) are diﬀerent, an interior optimum with positive holdings of
dominated assets is a possibility.
Other interesting point is the interaction of the divorce law-regime and
the labor supply decisions. Under pure common-law there is no reason to
think that the labor supply will be distorted because of dynamic strategic
reasons (that work through human capital accumulation and/or labor force
attachment as explained earlier), since the assets can be used to accomplish
right bargaining positions for future periods. This is not the case under
common-law legislation and thus dynamic strategic eﬀects of labor supply
become relevant. An interesting test of the levance of the model would be
to use data from the enactment of ”equitable division” clauses in the US
and see what kind of labor supply eﬀects did these law changes have.
4.2 Independent risk of divorce
The results of theorem 7 changes if one adds little bit of empirical relevance
to the model. In real life, divorces do occur. This section takes another
simplistic view (ignoring the link of past actions to divorces) by assuming
that divorce is a random event that strikes the couple with an exogenous
probability. This could be called “suddenly the love died out” view of divorce:
in the beginning of each period a random event (no divorce or divorce) is
realized. After that the couple renegotiates their allocation (e.g. by Nash-
bargaining) still taking into account the divorce outcomes as threat points
in their decision making, since they always have the option to divorce if the
negotiations breaks down.
Now, for the sake of argument, assume that there are three assets avail-
able to the couple: an asset that pays in the case of couple not divorcing
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and divorce insurance accounts (which can have also negative balances) for
both spouses. A divorce insurance is an insurance product, that will deliver
income to each spouse in the case of divorce (regardless of whether divorce
happens because of the exogenous shock or because of mutual welfare max-
imization).17
With divorce risk the decision problem can be written as:
V mt (At, Imt , I
f
t ) = max
cmt ,c
f
t ,At+1,
Imt+1,I
f
t+1
umt (cmt ) + (1− p)V mt+1(At+1, Imt+1, I
f
t+1) + pV˜
m
t+1(Imt+1)
subject to At = cmt + c
f
t +
(1− p)At+1
(1 + rt)
+
p(Imt+1 + I
f
t+1)
(1 + rt)
uft (c
f
t ) = V
f
t (At, I
m
t , I
f
t )− (1− p)V
f
t+1(At+1, I
m
t+1, I
f
t+1)− pV˜
f
t+1(I
f
t+1)
where V˜ mt+1 and V˜
f
t+1 represent the indirect utilities of spouses in case of
divorce and p is the probability of divorce.
Theorem 5. (Ineﬃciency theorem) With independent divorce risk,
generically the decision will not be eﬃcient.
Proof: Full eﬃciency requires that
um0t = (1 + rt)um0t+1 = (1 + rt)V˜ m0t+1
uf 0t = (1 + rt)u
f 0
t+1 = (1 + rt)V˜
f 0
t+1.
This means that full eﬃciency is a condition on 6 objectives (marginal
utilities to be equated). The couple only has five choice variables to achieve
this, so generically it cannot do this while satisfying the budget constraint.¥
The sense in which word “generically” is used in Theorem 5 is that start-
ing from a model where the solution of the problem without commitment
is fully eﬃcient; by slightly perturbing the problem (e.g. by changing how
the divorce threat points aﬀects current bargaining) we will always find so-
lutions that are not Pareto-eﬃcient. Conversely, if we start with a solution
17The huge moral hazard and assymmetric information problems related to divorce
insurance accounts are ignored in this section. The reason why divorce insurance is con-
sidered in this section is to illustrate even the perfect insurance markets would not restore
full eﬃciency.
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that is not fully eﬃcient, a slight perturbation of the problem will not lead
to a solution that is fully eﬃcient.
The basic problem in the model with independent divorce risk is that
the divorce insurance is used to do two things: to equate individual mar-
ginal utilities between current consumption and tomorrow’s divorce state;
and to equate the ratios of marginal utilities of spouses between today’s
consumption and tomorrow’s consumption.
The point about divorce insurance in this section was not to be a re-
alistic description of reality. Instead, the divorce insurance was considered
to illustrate the following point. With divorce insurance, the couple has
set of assets that span the future state-space. Since even with the complete
spanning they cannot always reach Pareto-eﬃcient allocation, they generally
cannot do that with less complete assets selection.
5 Death
Besides sharing of the current consumption, one of the potential points of
contention couples face is how much protection to provide for each spouse
in the case of the death of the other spouse. Since providing survivor pro-
tection is costly, spouses (even if one allows for altruistic motives) can have
diﬀering views on the optimal level of survivor protection. This section il-
lustrates that under complete markets the survivor protection is similar to
private consumption. Thus, under the class of models considered here and
with complete and perfect markets, there cannot be independent concern
about the lack of survivor protection without concern for the economic cir-
cumstances of the individual spouses while both partners are alive.18
With perfect insurance markets, the decision problem becomes:
18This does not mean that the view that couples seem to choose insuﬃcient amounts
of survivor protection is irrational. The results here depend on several assumptions. The
key assumption, that the couples have access to actuarially fair insurance, is especially
questionable for a large part of the population.
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V mt (At) = max
cmt ,c
f
t ,At+1,
Imt+1,I
f
t+1
umt (cmt ) + (1− pmt+1 − p
f
t+1 − p
mf
t+1)V
m
t+1(At+1) + pmt+1V˜
m
t+1(Imt+1)
subject to
At = cmt + c
f
t +
(1− pmt+1 − p
f
t+1 − p
mf
t+1)At+1
(1 + rt)
+
pmt+1Imt+1
(1 + rt)
+
pft+1I
f
t+1
(1 + rt)
uft (c
f
t ) = V
f
t (At)− (1− pmt+1 − p
f
t+1 − p
mf
t+1)V
f
t+1(At+1)− p
f
t+1V˜
f
t+1(I
f
t+1),
where pft+1 is the probability of the wife becoming a widow (and being
alive), pmft+1 is the probability of both spouses dying before next period, I
f
t
is life insurance protection protecting the wife and At is now an annuity
that ceases to pay when one partner dies.19 Note, that for simplicity, the
altruistic motives are assumed away from the specification.20
Theorem 6. (Limited eﬃciency of survivor protection) In the
optimum, neither spouse would like to trade his or her current period con-
sumption for more survivor protection.
Proof: Follows trivially from the first order condition for the optimum.¥
The key intuition that drives the diﬀerence between mortality and di-
vorce risk is that once spouses make their decisions about their consumption
allocations at period t+1 the survivor protection that they had for that pe-
riod t+ 1 is just an sunk investment that did not pay oﬀ, while the divorce
allocation can be seen as aﬀecting the allocation (e.g. through threat points
like in Nash-bargaining).
One of the key assumptions of the partial eﬃciency result is the ability
to adjust the level of life-insurance protection and annuity holdings each
period with actuarially fair pricing. A key feature in the real world of these
19The choice of At as an annuity product instead of regular savings account is just to save
on notation. As always, the choice of which group of assets to characterize a completely
spanned state-space allocation is completely irrelevant for substantive purposes.
20 If altruistic motives for survivor protection were to be included, then also altruistic
motives for current period consumption should be included for avoid biasing the model.
With altruistic motives, the interpretation of results would always hinge on whether the
altruistic motives between spouses are stronger when spouses are both alive or for survivor
protection.
25
life-contingent insurance products is that the required transactions to do this
are not necessarily available. Typically an annuity or life-insurance contract
is a long-term contract that cannot be undone in the next period without
non-trivial financial penalties.21 Unfortunately, the analysis of longer term
contracts is very complicated in the current setting because a purchase of
long term contract implies non-negativity constraints on the future alloca-
tions (since the purchase of more life-insurance protection is a possibility in
the future but the reverse transaction might not be available). Whether (a
modified version of) Theorem 6 holds with long-term contracts is left as an
open research question.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides starting-point for further research. The theoretical re-
sults identified in this paper could be taken to data to test the model of fam-
ily decision-making presented here against more restrictive models (single-
utility-function view of household) or more general models (non-cooperative
models of household). The results could also easily be extended to consider
risk more generally than is done in this paper.
The main conclusion of this paper is that at least in theoretical model
of family decision-making the inability to commit across time matters for
economic eﬃciency. The use of seemingly dominated assets can be explained
as an attempt to overcome the problems related to incomplete commitment.
Theorem 3 also provides an added justification why divorce as a phenomen
can lead couples to save more than they would otherwise do. This justi-
fication has nothing to do with the traditional “saving for the rainy day”
argument for increased savings (self-insuring against divorce). Instead, it is
shown that the fact that the divorce threat-points aﬀect the balance of power
within the family while still married can lead to higher saving through an
eﬀect that is analogous to decrease in the return on the assets. In Theorem
4, it is shown that in a simple model a stylized common-law divorce property
division regime is likely to lead to an eﬃcient solution. This results can be
viewed as an extension of Coase’s Theorem: in absence of transaction cost
21A purchase of annuity is often done in relation of conversion of pension wealth to
an annuity stream at retirement. This choice cannot often be undone. Adverse selection
concerns are one obvious plausible reason why the perfect access period-to-period markets
with actuarially fair pricing are not necessarily very accurate description of the reality for
many households.
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assigning property rights leads to a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome. However, this
results is shown to depend on the assumption of no exogenous divorce risks.
Taking into account this caveat and also taking into account the possible
diﬀering distributional impact of diﬀerent divorce regimes means that the
superiority of common-law over community property regime in the theoret-
ical model should be taken only as a tentative result. Further research on
the optimal divorce property division regimes is clearly needed.
7 Appendix: Proofs of Selected Propositions
7.1 Proof of Lemma 0
Lemma 0. Any one of the following assumptions is suﬃcient for Assumption
1 to be satisfied:
a) Value functions are independent of wealth for one the spouses: V f 0t = 0
∀t, At or V mt = 0 ∀t, At.
b) Two period world and wealth good for both in second period: let T = 2
and let the second period solution be characterized by a sharing rule
for wealth: cm2 = ψ2(A2) and c
f
2 = A2 − ψ2(A2) . Furthermore let
0 ≤ ψ20 ≤ 1.
c) T-period world, with last period described as in b) and letting the series
of functions V ft (At) satisfy following conditions: V
f 0
t ≥ 0, V
f 00
t ≤ 0
∀t, At and
(1 + rt)V f 0t+1(A) ≥ V
f 0
t (A) ∀t, A.
d) Like c), but applying the restrictions on V mt (A)-functions.
e) CRRA-utilities and outside options in repeated Nash-bargaining: Let
Assumptions 2-5 hold.
f) V m0t ≥ 0 and V m0t ≤ um0t ∀t in the solution; or equivalently V
f 0
t ≥ 0 and
V f 0t ≤ u
f 0
t ∀t in the solution.
Proofs:
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a) Direct consequence of envelope theorem and the first order conditions
yielding V m0t = um0t −
um0t+1
uf0t+1
V f 0t .
b) Under the assumptions, V m2 (A2) = um2 (ψ2(A2)) and V
f
2 (A2) = u
f
2(A2−
ψ2(A2)). Therefore V m02 ≥ 0 and V
f 0
2 ≥ 0 iﬀ 0 ≤ ψ20 ≤ 1.
c) By induction. Since last period is like period 2 in b) the claim holds
for last period. Now, the first order condition of the problem yields
um0t+1 −
um0t
1+rt = (λt+1 − λt)V
f 0
t+1. Using the fact that by induction as-
sumption V f 0t+1 ≤ um0t+1 this can be manipulated to yield
uf 0t
1+rt ≥ V
f 0
t+1.
Now using the assumption on the inequalities that V f -functions will
satisfy, concavity of V f and the fact At+1 ≤ At yields uf 0t ≥ (1 +
rt)V f 0t+1(At+1) ≥ V
f 0
t (At+1) ≥ V
f 0
t (At). By the calculation done in a)
this means that claim holds.
d) Same as c), except with roles of m and f reversed.
e) Follows from the positivity of γj and δj constants in Lemma A2.
f) Follows from the same calculation as a).
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 is proved in by first stating and proving two lemmas.
Lemma A1. Let assumptions 2-4 be satisfied. The Nash-Bargaining
problem in period t can be written as:
max
cmt ,c
f
t,At+1
ÃÃ
1
(1− θm) (c
m
t )
1−θm +
TX
k=t+1
(βm)k−t(γkAt+1)1−θ
m
!
−A1−θmt v˜mt
!
∗
Ã
1
(1− θf )
Ã³
cft
´1−θf
+
TX
k=t+1
(βf )k−t(δkAt+1)1−θ
f
!
−A1−θft v˜
f
t
!
subject to At = cmt + c
f
t +
At+1
(1 + rt)
,
for some constants v˜mt and v˜
f
t and series of constants γk and δk.
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Proof: Consider first the outside for the husband:
V˜ mt (At) = max{c˜mi }Ti=t
1
1− θm
TX
k=t
(β˜m)k−t(τmk c˜mk )1−θm
subject to αtAt =
TX
k=t
c˜mk
Πkj=t(1 + rj)j−t
.
By rewriting the objective as
V˜ mt (At) = max{c˜ml }Tk=t
A1−θmt
1
1− θm
TX
k=t
(β˜m)k−t(τmk
c˜mk
At
)1−θm
it is easy to see that V˜ mt (At) = A
1−θm
t V˜ mt (αt). The outside option value
function for the wife is handled similarly. The rest of the proof is a simple
induction argument. Consider the Nash-bargaining problem in period T :
max
cmt ,c
f
t
Ãµ
cmT
(1− θm)
¶1−θm
−A1−θmT v˜
m
T
!

Ã
cfT
(1− θf )
!1−θf
−A1−θfT v˜
f
T


subject to AT = cmT + c
f
T .
By the similar homogeneity argument as in the case of the outside op-
tions, the optimum solution for {cmT , cmT } is just a linear scaling of the optimal
solution in the case where AT = 1. The induction step, assuming that the
claim holds for period t+1, and showing that the claim holds for period t fol-
lows using exactly the same homogeneity of the objective function argument
as in the period T .
Lemma A2. Let the assumptions 2-4 hold. Consider maximization of
the linear combination of life time utilities of spouses (with weight µt on
wife’s utility, this being one characterization of a Pareto-eﬃcient solution
subject to constraints):
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W (At, µt) = max
At+1,{cmi ,cfi }ti=t
1
1− θ
Ã TX
k=t
βk−t(cmk )1−θ + µt
TX
k=t
βk−t(cfk)
1−θ
!
subject to At = cmt + c
f
t +
1
1 + rt
At+1
cmj = γjAt+1
cfj = δjAt+1,
where j = t + 1, ..., T and where the series of constants γ, δ satisfy the
budget constraint for future periods 1 =
PT
k=t+1
µ
γk+δk
Πkj=t+1(1+rj)j−t−1
¶
. For
θ > 1 the savingsAt+1 are higher than in the optimal unconstrained solution.
For θ = 1 (log utility) the savings At+1 are always at the first best level. For
θ < 1 the savings At+1 are lower than in the optimal unconstrained solution.
Proof: Substitute the constraints for future consumption into the ob-
jective and consider the first order condition:
cmt = µ
−1/θ
t c
f
t
cmt = (1 + rt)−1/θAt+1 ∗ ω
−1/θ
t
where ωt =
TX
k=t+1
βk−tγ1−θk + µt
TX
k=t
βk−tδ1−θk
The second part of the claim is immediate from above: in the case of
θ = 1 the choice of the coeﬃcients does not aﬀect the savings level.22 Next
consider the case where θ > 1 and consider ωt as a function of (γk, δk)
T
k=t+1.
Subject to the constraint 1 =
PT
k=t+1
µ
γk+δk
Πkj=t+1(1+rj)j−t−1
¶
, the function
ωt has an unique minimum (since it is a convex function) at the choice
(γk, δk)
t
k=t+1 that correspond to the unconstrained optimal solution of joint
utility maximization. This fact, budget constraint and the first order condi-
tions imply that for any feasible choice of (γk, δk)
t
k=t+1 the wealth holdings
in period t+1 will be higher than in the unconstrained optimum. For θ < 1,
similar reasoning will imply that the capital stock in period t+1 will be lower
than in the unconstrained optimum (since ωt now is a concave function).¥
22Naturally, a separate treatment of the log-utility would confirm this result.
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Theorem 3 (from the main text): Let assumptions 2-5 hold. The
inability to commit across periods implies higher wealth holdings in every
period after initial period (more savings) if θ > 1. For θ = 1 (log utility)
the level of savings is unaﬀected by the inability to commit. For θ < 1 the
inability to commit decreases savings in every period.
Proof: Application of Lemmas A1 and A2. By Lemma A1 the problem
in any period can be written as Nash-Bargaining with future consumption al-
location being a linear transformation of tomorrows wealth. Since any Nash-
bargaining solution is Pareto-eﬃcient (with respect to constraints) Lemma
A2 applies here for some µt. To prove the theorem, it now suﬃces to no-
tice that under the assumption of equal discount rates and θ-parameters for
spouses, any fully Pareto-eﬃcient solution will imply same levels of wealth
holdings, so the fact that the fully eﬃcient (with commitment) solution
corresponds to a (potentially) diﬀerent welfare µt becomes irrelevant.¥
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